Estimating the Cost of an Article V Convention
By Geoffrey Hersch, JD

Introduction

Advocates of amending the U.S. Constitution through a convention to propose amendments under Article V often fail to grapple with commonsense questions about the process. They prefer instead to publish esoteric tracts on constitutional law and history. However, at bottom, an Article V convention is a governmental activity. One of the most basic commonsense threshold questions that should be asked about any governmental activity before it begins is: “How much will it cost?” The same question should be asked about the cost of an Article V convention; especially as interest in convening such bodies gains steam around the country for everything from a total revision of the Constitution1 to single amendment proposals.2

This article estimates the ultimate cost of an Article V convention as ranging between forty-one thousand dollars (Compact for a Balanced Budget) and three hundred fifty million dollars (unlimited convention) by analogy to the expenditures for state conventions during the 1960s and 1970s.3 Although an Article V convention is not legally empowered to accomplish everything a state constitutional convention can accomplish,4 both types of conventions can have similar organizational structures and, therefore, can be expected to have similar cost components. During the 1960s and 1970s, several states made significant constitutional amendments and revisions by convention, including many related to reapportionment.5 These bodies reflect the substantial variation in cost for such a convention.6

The following sections immediately offer our findings and conclusions; and then briefly address relevant characteristics of state conventions and their rules, including their duration, the number of delegates, their election, compensation, and occupations, state appropriations for conventions, the selection of officers, the structure and appointment of committees, the proposals by each convention, and their relative success.7 The findings and conclusions reached by this article arise from a methodology described in more detail in the appendix. Essentially, we have estimated the cost of various types of Article V conventions based on a standard statistical regression model using inflation-adjusted data from analogous historical state conventions.

Findings and Conclusions

Based on the available data from state constitutional conventions during the 1960s and 1970s, the projected expenditures for an article V convention are reflected in Table I. The average cost of the underlying state conventions, their average duration, and the average number of delegates and committees is reflected in Table II, as well as the cost of each convention relative to each of these characteristics. Fur-
thermore, the following pages provide a breakdown of information regarding state conventions based on the conventions that were limited in scope compared with those that were unlimited reflected in Tables III and IV respectively.

The first two estimates shown in Table I were based on an assumption of 9 delegates per state with 50 states attending the Article V convention (based on delegate appointment legislation proposed in Florida and New Hampshire). The third estimate is based on the assumption that a laser-focused convention organized along the lines of the Compact for a Balanced Budget will involve 100 delegates (25 states appearing through their governors and 25 states appearing through three delegates), one committee of the whole, and a 24-hour convention duration. Based on those assumptions, the cost output was generated using a regression model constituted by the data shown in Table II for state conventions. The “lower,” "fit," and “upper” prediction intervals in Table I are likely very conservative for the first two convention types because we relied on the regression model to estimate automatically the underlying duration and committee numbers based on our state convention data in Table II. This may understate the potential duration and numbers of committees at such conventions. For example, an unlimited or broadly limited Article V convention could easily have as many as 1000 delegates serving on 20 or more commit-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected Cost of an Article V Convention</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Fit</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited convention of 450 Delegates</td>
<td>$13,203,000</td>
<td>$52,612,000</td>
<td>$92,021,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited Convention of 450 Delegates</td>
<td>$38,350,000</td>
<td>$191,193,000</td>
<td>$344,036,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Convention of 100 Delegates for 24-hour period</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$791,392.10</td>
<td>$14,493,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** All figures in this table were rounded to the nearest thousand. The data for this table reflects the prediction intervals for the cost of each approach to an Article V convention, based on the data reflected in Table II. Specifically, the data from that table—not including New Hampshire and New Jersey—was used to formulate multiple linear regressions for limited and unlimited conventions, based on their duration, the number of delegates, and the number of committees. The number of delegates—and the duration for the third category—were then input as new data and used with the regression models to create a prediction interval reflecting the projected cost for each convention approach. The descriptive statistics for the regressions mentioned above, while helpful to demonstrate the variation in the adjusted cost of conventions attributable to their duration and the number of delegates and committees is less significant with respect to the prediction intervals provided in the table because the prediction interval necessarily accounts for uncertainty in a single prediction compared with a predicted mean of an additional sample. Note. The primary purpose of the regression models based on data reflected in Table II is to provide a method for establishing the prediction intervals in the above table. Therefore, although the t-statistic and p-value for each variable provides interesting insight into their relationship with the adjusted cost of a convention, the p-values for each of the regression models in their entirety reflect a sufficient relationship to establish significance with 90% confidence and the above prediction intervals necessarily account for the potential error in projecting the cost of a single convention. Thus, the models provide a more accurate estimation of an Article V convention based strictly on the 1960s and 1970s state constitutional conventions than using minimum, maximum, and average figures alone.

As discussed, the estimates provide merely a baseline prediction, however, these are subject to change where characteristics such as the number of delegates, the duration, or the number of committees are not controlled.

The lower bound of the estimate for a 100 delegate 24-hour convention is not available because the model for state conventions has a negative intercept and the limitations to only 100 delegates and a single day yield sufficiently low values that the projection exceeds the scope of the model and yields a negative cost. Therefore, the lowermost bound of the prediction interval, without undermining its fit by trying to force the intercept, is most accurately stated as outside the scope of the model. Although the lower bound for a single-day, 100 delegate, limited convention exceeds the scope of the model, it is nonetheless possible to produce a reasonable projection. For example, the $41,046 figure reflects the average daily per delegate cost for limited conventions, applied to 100 delegates, for a single 24-hour period, which provides a potential lower bound for the approach.
### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Duration (days)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Delegates&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Committees&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Inflation Adjusted Cost&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per day)</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per delegate)</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per committee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,777,000</td>
<td>22,752</td>
<td>44,963</td>
<td>1,258,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15,756,000</td>
<td>41,572</td>
<td>119,362</td>
<td>1,312,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,114,000</td>
<td>77,178</td>
<td>68,182</td>
<td>1,389,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>11,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,749,000</td>
<td>7,121</td>
<td>27,763</td>
<td>137,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18,341,000</td>
<td>89,905</td>
<td>101,329</td>
<td>1,410,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,209,000</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>22,087</td>
<td>169,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5,474,000</td>
<td>43,794</td>
<td>53,669</td>
<td>342,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18,673,000</td>
<td>50,195</td>
<td>160,970</td>
<td>1,556,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14,248,000</td>
<td>58,156</td>
<td>100,339</td>
<td>1,295,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,273,000</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>8,842</td>
<td>97,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,933,000</td>
<td>15,439</td>
<td>29,334</td>
<td>209,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,621,000</td>
<td>12,763</td>
<td>23,155</td>
<td>135,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71,241,000</td>
<td>328,300</td>
<td>383,016</td>
<td>4,749,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,525,000</td>
<td>12,960</td>
<td>35,970</td>
<td>271,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11,536,000</td>
<td>51,157</td>
<td>78,670</td>
<td>956,519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Averages for the first three columns were rounded to the nearest whole number, the average for adjusted cost to the nearest thousand, and averages for the final three columns to the nearest whole number. Further, figures for adjusted cost were rounded to the nearest thousand and figures for the adjusted cost by duration, the number of delegates, and the number of committees were rounded to the nearest whole number.

**Note.** As mentioned, the duration of each convention reflects the date from which the body was convened until the date in which the vote for the first proposals by the relevant body was to be submitted to voters for approval. This standard is used because the different procedures for each convention make estimating the number of actual days each body was convened unclear. For example, certain conventions adjourned, but were later reconvened to make amendments, some were continuing bodies, others only held partial meetings for the entire body and largely operated through committees, and some initially met and adjourned for a period with committees working the interim. Thus, considering the ultimate goal of an article V convention would be proposal and ratification of an amendment, the amount of time from the initial convening until the date of submission for voter approval is used as a standard to allow for reasonable comparison.


<sup>a</sup> See infra at Page 8.
<sup>b</sup> See infra at Page 8.
<sup>c</sup> See infra at Pages 8-9.
<sup>d</sup> See infra at Page 10 (Appendix-Methodology).
If we had inputted those specific numbers into our model (while still using state convention data to estimate the likely duration), the “fit” prediction for an unlimited Article V convention would leap to $205,123,110, with low and high bounds of $59,353,767 and $350,892,454.

**Limited Conventions**

As used in this article, a “limited convention” is: a convention with authority to propose changes confined to specific subjects or areas. Conventions that were characterized as limited bodies, included Connecticut, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. On average, limited conventions lasted approximately 210 days, with 127 delegates serving on 11 committees. Furthermore, average appropriations for limited conventions were $7,668,375.25 when adjusted for inflation. As a result, the average adjusted cost per day was $35,448.97, the average adjusted cost per delegate was $53,891.78, and $920,217.25 per committee. Finally, Figures 1–3 represent the relationship between the duration of limited conventions, the number of delegates and committees and the adjusted cost of each convention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Inflation Adjusted Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,777,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15,756,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2,749,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,834,1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8,640,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table III*

**Note.** Averages were rounded to the nearest whole number, except the adjusted cost, which is rounded to the nearest thousand. The data for this table reflects the figures provided in Table II limited to those conventions characterized as limited conventions, meaning they did not have plenary authority to propose amendments.
**Figure 2**

Limited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Delegates

- Connecticut
- Louisiana
- Pennsylvania
- Rhode Island
- Tennessee
- Texas

**Figure 3**

Limited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Committees

- Connecticut
- Louisiana
- Pennsylvania
- Rhode Island
- Tennessee
- Texas
Unlimited Conventions

As used in this article, an unlimited convention is one that has complete authority to propose any constitutional change. The group of unlimited conventions included Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and North Dakota. The average duration for unlimited conventions was 322 days and composed of approximately 118 delegates and 13 committees. For unlimited conventions, the average cost adjusted for inflation was $12,206,600. Finally, Figures 4–6 represent the relationship between the duration of limited conventions, the number of delegates and committees and the adjusted cost of each convention.

Table IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Inflation Adjusted Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,273,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,933,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,621,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71,241,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13,466,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Averages were rounded to the nearest whole number, except the adjusted cost, which is rounded to the nearest thousand. Note. The data in this table reflects that from Table II, for only conventions characterized as unlimited conventions meaning they exercised complete authority in proposing amendments, revisions, or entirely new constitutions.
Figure 5

Unlimited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Delegates

Figure 6

Unlimited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Committees
Further, in Hawaii, state or county officials were required to take an unpaid leave of absence to serve as delegates. Michigan, however, prohibited active members of the legislature, active circuit judges, and sheriffs from being delegates, but individuals could still generally receive compensation from private employers. New York permitted numerous sitting judges to act as delegates for its convention. In Michigan, as in other states, there were many attorneys, businessmen, former state and local officials, and similar individuals acting as delegates, however, there were also technical workers, manufacturers, and homemakers. Not every state explicitly provided for the replacement of delegates other than officers, but Hawaii and Michigan permitted the governor to appoint a qualified elector from the same district and New York permitted the remaining delegates from the district or the group of at large delegates to vote a qualified elector in as a replacement. By contrast, as indicated previously, Texas exclusively had delegates that were legislators on leave while acting as delegates. In every state, delegates elected the president or chairman of the convention shortly after being convened.

**Delegates**

New Mexico’s seventy-delegate convention was the smallest during the period contrasted by the four hundred delegates attending the New Hampshire constitutional convention. Few other states had less than one hundred, and all others had between one hundred and two hundred delegates. Almost every state provided for the election of a portion of delegates, if not all delegates. Delegates for Texas, however, exclusively included members of the state legislature. Delegates to the Hawaii convention were paid $1,000 a month, up to $4,000, mileage based on their location, and a per diem. Illinois delegates received $625 a month, not to exceed eight months, and a per diem for a maximum of 100 days, a postage allotment and expenses. Maryland delegates received a flat fee of $2000 and a $25 per diem for expenses. Delegates in Michigan received $7,500 and mileage once a month between their home and the convention. Significantly, New Hampshire did not have a pay plan for delegates and merely reimbursed certain expenses. Conversely, New York paid delegates the same salary as legislators, which included $15,000 per annum and $3,000 for expenses. Finally, Tennessee delegates received the same per diem and mileage as legislators, which was approximately $63 per day.

**State Appropriations**

The amount states appropriated for their conventions also varied considerably; for example, Rhode Island’s conventions only initially included $224,000 and $20,000 in appropriations respectively, despite the duration of the first convention, while Texas provided legislators with $3.8 million. Occasional-ly other states, including Michigan, provided smaller appropriations, but relied on private grants to help subsidize the cost of preparation and organization. New Hampshire provided $180,000, New Mexico’s brief convention received a $250,000 appropriation, and Montana followed at $499,281. Connecticut appropriated $500,000, North Dakota $600,000, Arkansas $605,200, and Tennessee’s convention exceeded its appropriations more than
The Maryland convention’s proposed constitution, however, was rejected when submitted for voter approval. Michigan voters eventually adopted the new constitution proposed by their convention. Montana voters approved of the new constitution and multiple of the proposed alternatives by the convention. In New Hampshire, voters eventually approved 10 amendments submitted as referendums of the 27 proposed by the convention. Voters approved the New Jersey convention’s proposal that was limited to apportionment. New Mexico’s proposed constitution, on the other hand, was quickly rejected by voters, as were New York’s and North Dakota’s. The Pennsylvania convention’s five proposed amendments were approved by voters. Rhode Island’s constitution was initially rejected, but several amendments were eventually passed. In Tennessee, of thirteen proposals submitted by the convention, voters approved twelve. Finally, the Texas convention failed to even establish sufficient support to submit a new constitution to voters for approval.

**Successes and Failures**

After completing the proposed Arkansas constitution, voters rejected the convention’s work in November 1970. Conversely, Connecticut’s convention proposed amendments on the topics to which it was limited and voters ultimately approved fourteen articles. In Hawaii, the convention proposed 34 amendments after considering 105 proposals, and voters eventually approved every amendment. Illinois voters approved of the convention’s proposed constitution, but ultimately rejected the alternative proposals made by the convention. Louisiana’s convention proposed a new constitution that was ultimately adopted by voters.

**Limited conventions were more successful than attempts at revision of an entire state constitution.**

**Conclusion**

In sum, the conventions of the 1960s and 1970s reflect the flexibility and variety amongst state constitutional convention rules and procedures. However, it is worth mentioning that the average cost of limited conventions was roughly half that of unlimited conventions, and that proposals offered to voters incrementally or separated from major controversial provisions were more successful than attempts at wholesale revision of an entire, or nearly entire, state constitution. As policy makers and advocates look to the array of Article V convention options, from the Compact for a Balanced Budget to the Convention of States model, it should not be forgotten that their choice will eventually have a price tag.
As our model’s “fit” prediction indicates, the cost is likely $791,500 for the strictly limited convention of the Compact for a Balanced Budget, $52.5 million for a narrowly enforced topic-limited convention, and $191.2 million for a defacto or actual unlimited convention.

# # #

Geoff Hersch recently completed his J.D. at Chapman University. He has a Bachelor of Science in Political Science and Criminology from the University of Idaho. He served as a legislative intern in the U.S. House of Representatives, and as a law clerk with Legal Aid of Cambodia, the Orange County District Attorney in the Special Prosecutions and Homicide Units, and the Startup Cities Institute. Geoff recently finished a Bastiat Fellowship with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Acknowledgements

Appreciation to Nick Dranias and Chip DeMoss for their thorough guidance for this report, as well as Roman Buhler and the Council of Scholars members from Compact for America Educational Foundation who provided integral feedback.

Appendix: Methodology

Data for the foregoing analysis was collected from a variety of archives of state records, memoranda by state agencies, and articles and books. The duration of each convention is measured from the time the body first convened until the date its first proposals were submitted to voters. The number of delegates reflects the raw number of individuals elected, not the number of votes apportioned among them. The number of committees refers to standing committees of each convention, not including the committee of the whole, which generally reflects the entire body operating informally. The cost of each convention is determined by the appropriations made for the body. The adjusted cost reflects that figure, adjusted for inflation net of average annual CPI based on data available through the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, conventions were grouped based on whether they were granted authority to make only particular revision proposals to their state’s constitution or whether they were convened as an unlimited body permitted to propose complete revision or a new constitution.

These figures were then built into a set of data frames in R, grouped by bodies characterized as limited and unlimited conventions. The data frames were used to develop basic descriptive statistics of the minimum, maximum, average, and quadrant breakdown for the duration, number of delegates, number of committees, and adjusted cost. Furthermore, using R, multiple linear regression models were developed for limited conventions and unlimited conventions, including further descriptive statistics of the models. Finally, new data frames were created for each of the proposed approaches to an article V convention and incorporated into the appropriate linear model to create a prediction interval reflecting the projected cost of each.
Regression Model Outputs

> Limited <- data.frame(
+ Adjusted Cost = c(3776904.76, 15755817.57, 11113598.80, 107182.43, 2748539.60, 18340588.24),
+ Duration = c(166, 470, 144, 63, 218, 203),
+ Delegates = c(84, 132, 163, 100, 99, 181),
+ Committees = c(3, 12, 8, 9, 20, 13))
> Limited

State Adjusted.Cost Duration Delegates Committees
1 Connecticut 3776904.76 166 84 3
2 Louisiana 15755817.57 470 132 12
3 Pennsylvania 11113598.80 144 163 8
4 Rhode Island 107182.43 63 100 9
5 Tennessee 2748539.60 218 99 20
6 Texas 18340588.24 203 181 13
> summary(Limited)

Call:
lm(formula = Adjusted.Cost ~ Duration + Delegates + Committees,
    data = Limited)

Residuals:
   1       2       3       4       5       6
  110994  110880 -2971904  1067359 -1195894  1880565

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -15842936  4882341  -3.245  0.0033  
Duration 36909         13647   2.704  0.1138  
Delegates  181502       33478   5.422  0.0324  *
Committees  621413       317010  -1.960  0.1890  
---
Signif. codes:  0 ***  0.001 **  0.01 *  0.05 .  0.1  1

Residual standard error: 2844000 on 2 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.9426,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.8566
F-statistic: 10.95 on 3 and 2 DF,  p-value: 0.08481

> lm(Limited)

Call:
lm(formula = Limited)

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 4.168e+00 3.128e-07 -1.613e-02 -2.796e-02 3.290e-01

Warning messages:
1: In model.response(mf, "numeric") : 
   using type = "numeric" with a factor response will be ignored
2: In Ops.factor(y, z$Residuals) : 
   ‘-’ not meaningful for factors
> plot(Limited)
> Limited.lm <- lm(Adjusted.Cost ~ Duration + Delegates + Committees, data=Limited)
> summary(Limited.lm)

Call:
lm(formula = Adjusted.Cost ~ Duration + Delegates + Committees,
    data = Limited)

Residuals:
   1       2       3       4       5       6
  1308672.5 -634892.0 -1879815.1 -764569.9 -788.9  1971393.4

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -14409925  3757527  -3.835  0.0618  
Duration 275539         7670   3.590  0.0696  
Delegates  153772       26243   5.860  0.0279  *
Committees  203383       185310  -1.098  0.3869  
---
Signif. codes:  0 ***  0.001 **  0.01 *  0.05 .  0.1  1
Residual standard error: 2249000 on 2 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.9641,    Adjusted R-squared: 0.9103
F-statistic: 17.91 on 3 and 2 DF,  p-value: 0.0033

> newdata=data.frame(Delegates=450)
> predict(limited.lm,newdata,interval="predict")

1 52612199 13203329 92021070

> Unlimited.data.frame{
  + "Adjusted Cost"=c(2208655.12,5474194.79,18672523.16,14248203.59,1273284.28,2933369.33,1620875,71241017.96,3525111.11),
  + Duration=c(694,125,372,245,545,190,126,217,388),
  + Delegates=c(100,102,116,142,144,100,70,186,98),
  + Committees=c(13,16,12,11,13,14,12,15,13)
}

> Unlimited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>2208655.12</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>5474194.79</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>18672523.16</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>14248203.59</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1273284.28</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>2933369.33</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>1620875</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>71241017.96</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>3525111.11</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

> summary(Unlimited)

            State Adjusted.Cost Duration Delegates
Arkansas:1  Min. :1273284  Min. :125.0  Min. :70.0
Hawaii:1   1st Qu.:2208655  1st Qu.:190.0  1st Qu.:100.0
Illinois:1 Median :5474194 Median :245.0 Median :102.0
Maryland:1  Mean  :13466360 Mean  :322.4 Mean  :117.6
Michigan:1  3rd Qu.:14248204  3rd Qu.:388.0  3rd Qu.:142.0
Montana:1   Max.  :71241018  Max.  :694.0  Max.  :186.0

3 Committees
Min. :11.0
1st Qu.:12.0
Median :13.0
Mean :13.22
3rd Qu.:14.0
Max. :16.0

> lm(Unlimited)

Call:
  lm(formula = Unlimited)

Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  1.009e+01  4.894e-08  2.09e+03   <2e-16     
Adjusted.Cost  4.894e-08  4.107e-03   1.19e+00   0.2354     
Duration       -9.791e-03  9.750e-03  -1.00e+00   0.3163     
Delegates      -7.125e+04  6.551e+03  -1.09e+02  0.2670      
Committees     -3.123e-01  3.123e-01  -1.00e+00   0.3014     

Warning messages:
1: in model.response(mf, "numeric") :
   using type = "numeric" with a factor response will be ignored
2: in Ops.factor(y, z$residuals) : `-` not meaningful for factors

> plot(Unlimited)
> Unlimited.lm<lm(Adjusted.Cost~Duration+Delegates+Committees,data=Unlimited)
> summary(Unlimited.lm)

Call:
  lm(formula = Adjusted.Cost ~ Duration + Delegates + Committees, 
     data = Unlimited)

Residuals:
     1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8
   9132858 -10003376 9331063 -10767521 -18951294 -6551743 8792211 16575051
2442752

Coefficients:  
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept)  57865613  50964611  -1.135  0.3077  
Duration     -29544     28510  -1.036  0.3476  
Delegates    516971     158839   3.255  0.0226 *  
Committees   1519075   3613660   0.420  0.6917  
---  
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  

Residual standard error: 15140000 on 5 degrees of freedom  
Multiple R-squared:  0.7172,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.5476  
F-statistic: 4.228 on 3 and 5 DF,  p-value: 0.07731  

> newdata=data.frame(Delegates=450)  
> predict(UNlimited.in, newdata, interval="predict")  

     fit       lwr       upr  
1  191133193 38350485 344035901
```r
> Limited <- data.frame(
+ Adjusted.Cost = c(3775904.76, 15755817.57, 11113598.80, 107182.43, 2748539.60, 18340588.24),
+ Duration = c(166, 470, 144, 63, 218, 203),
+ Delegates = c(84, 132, 163, 100, 99, 181),
+ Committees = c(3, 12, 8, 9, 20, 13)
> Limited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Adjusted.Cost</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>3775904.76</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>15755817.57</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>11113598.80</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>107182.43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>2748539.60</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>18340588.24</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
> lm(Limited)

Call:
  lm(formula = Limited)

Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) -14409925  3757527 -3.835  0.0618 .
Duration      7670        3.590    2.14  0.0696 .
Delegates     153772     26243  5.860   0.0279 *
Committees   -203383      185310 -1.098  0.3869
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 2249000 on 2 degrees of freedom  
Multiple R-squared:  0.9641,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.9203  
F-statistic: 17.91 on 3 and 2 DF,  p-value: 0.05354

> newdata <- data.frame(
+ (Duration = 1),
+ (Delegates = 100),
+ (Committees = 1))
> Error in data.frame((duration - 1), (delegates - 100)(committees - 1)) :  
| attempt to apply non-function
> predict(Limited.lm, newdata, interval = "predict")

fit  lwr  upr
1  2941392.1  -12911169  14423953
```
Constitutional Convention at 12 (1997) (describing the more than $10 million that was spent on the convention, not including the amount spent by third-parties to establish support for the proposed constitution).

7. As mentioned, characteristics of state conventions varied substantially. For example, Rhode Island held multiple conventions during the two decades reflected the second being substantially shorter, more limited in scope, and more successful than the first. See Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1972–1973, in The Book of the States, 1974–1975 at 12 (1974) (describing the stark contrast between the two Rhode Island conventions). Thus, the following analysis controls for such variations as best as possible—for example, the duration of each convention reflects the time from which the body was convened until the date the first proposals offered by each body were submitted to voters for approval—however, many conventions first met to establish procedures and elect officers before adjourning for a period, others returned to make amendments after apparently adjourning, and others held committee meetings and hearings while not in session. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. Therefore, the discussion should also be read with the understanding that the ultimate duration of a convention is subject to variation based on these differences.

8. Specifically, the characteristics described for each approach were run through the appropriate regression model and where a particular input is not established—for example, the duration of an unlimited convention is not defined—the regression model accounts for the variation in cost based on the projected input.

11. Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1980–81 and the Past 50 Years, in The Book of the States, 1982–1983 at 120–23 (1982). The clearest example of a limited Article V convention would be the one that would be organized by the Compact for a Balanced Budget. See Nick Dranias, States Can Fix the National Debt: Reforming Washington with the Compact for America Balanced Budget Amendment, Goldwater Institute Policy Report No. 257 at 17–19 (Apr. 23, 2013). It would limit the convention to voting up or down a particular amendment. Other examples could include topic-limited conventions, such as the longstanding Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force effort. See Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, Balanced Budget Amendment Convention, at 8–9 (2013). However, topic limited conventions could be subject to creative legal arguments regarding germaneness rules that render them effectively unlimited conventions. See infra n.12.

12. See Table III. Texas was only limited in the sense that the Legislature acting as a convention was not permitted to change the state Bill of Rights, but could make changes to any other article or provision within the state Constitution. See Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, in The Book of the States, 1974–1975 at 170 (1974).

13. See Table III.

14. See Table III.

15. Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1980–81 and the Past 50 Years, in The Book of the States, 1982–1983 at 120–23 (1982). It is possible for a purportedly limited convention to function as a de facto unlimited convention under pressure from creative interpretations of a rule of germaneness. For example, the Convention of States effort calls for a convention limited to “proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States requiring that in the absence of a national emergency the total of all Federal appropriations made by Congress for any fiscal year may not exceed the total of all estimated Federal revenues for that fiscal year, together with any related and appropriate fiscal restraints.” See Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, Balanced Budget Amendment Convention, at 7 (2013) This may appear to be a request for a limited agenda on its face. However, a creative convention delegate may attempt to argue that amendment proposals transferring federal governing authority to the United Nations, other countries, or new governmental bodies are germane. If such an argument were to persuade the convention parliamentarian, there would be no effective limit on such a convention.

16. See Table IV.

17. See Table IV.

18. See Table IV.


55. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Connecticut: 1965 at 18 (1965); Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision 1976–1977, in The Book of the States, 1978–1979 at 201 (1978). Although a memorandum by the Legislative Service Bureau for Iowa stated the Tennessee Convention used 20 committees, the discrepancy is likely due to the inclusion of the Committee of the Whole, whereas, the same was likely not included in the count by Sturm. See Iowa Legislative Service Bureau, Constitutional Convention in Iowa at 2 (August, 1980).


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